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ELECTIONS, IDENTITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT
IN THE CARIBBEAN: THE TRINIDAD CASE
by Ralph R. PREMDAS
Department of Government
University of the West Indies
St. Augustine
Trinidad and Tobago
Below the surface of Trinidad's political peace exists an
antagonistic ethnic monster waiting its moment of opportunity to
explode!. The image of a politically stable and economically prosperous
state however conceals powerful internal contradictions in the society.
Many critical tensions prowl through the body politic threatening to
throw the society into turmoil. Perhaps, the most salient of these tensions
derives from the country's multi-ethnic population. Among the one
million, two hundred thousand citizens live four distinct ethno-racial
groups: Africans, Asian Indians, Europeans and Chinese. For two
centuries, these groups co-existed in Trinidad, but failed to evolve a
consensus of shared values so as to engender a sense of common
citizenship and a shared identity. Below the veneer of inter-communal
camaraderie lurks a sense of deep ethnically rooted sectionalism which
pervades the society. After the colonial power departed in 1962, the new
state found itself preoccupied by the rival political claims of the
1 For general discussions of Trinidad, politics, see: K. Yelvington (ed.), Ethnicity in
Trinidad, London, Macmillan, 1992; I. Oxaal, Black Bourgeoisie Come To Power,
Massachusetts, Schenkman, 1968; Ralph Premdas, "Political Succession in Trinidad
and Tobago", in The Modern Caribbean, edited by P. Sutton and A. Payne, Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins Press, 1992; Percy Hintzen, The Costs of Regime Survival, London,
Cambridge University Press, 1989; S.B. MacDonald, Democracy and Development in
the Caribbean, New York, Praeger, 1986; Jose Sandoval, "State Capitalism in a
Petroleum-Based Economy", in Crisis in the Caribbean, edited by P. Ambursley,
London, Heineman, 1983; V. Naipaul, Guerrillas, London, Penguin, 1980; B. Brereton,
Race Relations in Colonial Trinidad 1870-1900, London, Cambridge University Press,
1979; D. Wood, Trinidad in Transition, Oxford, 1968; R. Premdas (ed)., The Enigma of
Ethnicity, UWI, 1993.
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African 444,804 38.91 %
Indian 452,709 39.60 %
Chinese 4,322 .38 %
Syrian/Lebanese 936 .08 %
White 7,302 .64 %
Mixed 207,280 18.13 %
Others 25,773 2.35 %
Total 1,143,126 100%
Ralph R. PREMDAS
country's two largest ethnic sections constituted of Indians and Africans
in antagonistic relationship to each other. This is the basic contradiction
in the state coming to occupy center stage in politicallife defining issues
and dominating daily discourse.
TableI:
P l fi d Eth . G . ~. 'd d d ~ b
(1990 Census: Trinidad and Tobago Statistical Office)
The pivotal problem thrown up by Trinidad's multi-ethnicity in
part pertains to collective communal interests and sectional identity. Each
ethnic section sees its interests differently not only in relation to its
symbolic and cultural life but in relation to claims to economics
resources. The unintegrated state subsumes a variety of discrete sub-
cultural communities each bound by a configuration of unique social
traits that constitute its identity, if only in the imagination2. Inter-
communal conflict is in fact identity politics expressed as assertions for
symbolic recognition and material resources. In turn, at the political
level, inter-communal competition reverberates on the issue of
establishing legitimate rule in a form of government that does not pose a
threat to the survival of another group's identity and interests and that
ensures that the values of the state can be equity distributed. The
governmental system bequeathed by Britain was anything but an
arrangement that guaranteed the fulfillment of these political and cultural
aims. Indeed the inherited British parliamentary system was erected on a
zero-sum competitive party system that tended to inflame ethnic passions
2 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London, Verso, 1983; see also Ralph
Premdas, Ethnic Identity in the Caribbean, Toronto, University of Toronto, R.F. Harney
Monograph Papers and Lectures Series on Multiculturalism and Ethnicity, 1995.
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and apportion privileges very unevenly. This internal contradiction in
Trinidad's polity stands as its most potent threat to stability of the
society. Ethnic dominance in government and identity politics soon
became a way of life fraught with an immense undercurrent of sectional
alienation for the losers in the competition for recognition and resources.
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ELECTIONS
Each election that came tended to raise anew all the unresolved
issues of ethnic equity. As it happened in Trinidad, one ethnic group in
an essentially ethnically bi-polar state had captured power and in the
perception of the other major ethnic community instituted an order that
was ethnically repressive and discriminatory. An election campaign
assumed the form of identity rivalry expressed in a collective communal
struggle in which the claims of each community as a whole were
reignited anew and expressed in uncompromising terms. Repeated
victory by one sectional community over the other was not accepted by
the vanquished group which withdrew its moral support from the state.
Elections have served as the critical arbiter in adjudicating the
rival claims by the main ethno-cultural communities for power and
privilege. In Trinidad's multi-ethnic setting however, the function of the
election device had been thrown into question on several counts3. First,
as a means of providing representation to citizens, elections seemed
instead to have supplied a fractured public will following communal
lines. While democracy is not about government by unanimity and is
inherently partisan, for it to operate effectively it must be cast within the
context of a larger citizen commitment to the general values and beliefs
of the system as a whole. Thus, elections in states that are not deeply
divided but share a social consensus are rarely about radical re-
structuring of the underlying social contract but tend to serve as a ritual
that affirm citizen commitment to the political system as well as supply
decision-makers for the polity. The voting act then serves symbolically to
3 For a discussion of the role of elections in multi-ethnic states, see: R.S. Milne,
"Elections in Developing Countries", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XVIll, No.1, 1964-
1965; Ralph Premdas, "Elections and Campaigns in a racially Bifurcated state", Journal
of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1972.
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link citizens to the system and to each other regardless of the party that
wins the elections. Issues are moderately debated and rarely so inflame
passions that threaten to rip the society apart. All of these latent functions
that inhere in the elections institution are enacted only when the larger
context of shared trust binds overwhelming majority of citizens and
where representative to public opinion and can be periodically changed.
The electoral device with these internal properties, however, was
imported into Trinidad from British roots, an environment radically
different in social structure from Trinidad. The adaptation of the electoral
device to the multi-ethnic society in Trinidad has left important questions
unresolved about the roles of representation, identity, integration, citizen
commitment, and government accountability traditionally assigned to the
electoral system. In particular, representation tends to become
communalized so that the party in power symbolizes not the public will
at large but sectional solidarity and ethnically particularized interests.
Citizen commitment is passionately expressed but communally cleaved
so that only one section at a time identifies with the governing regime.
The out-section is alienated.
Elections elicit fearsome primordial responses and deeply divisive
fears in culturally fractured states. In a communally divided society
lacking shared beliefs and identities, all political structures however
neutrally designed tend to be tainted and imbued with suspect ethnic
motifs and interests. Communal identities are at stake for in defeat the
vanquished may witness the marginalization of its way of life.
Consequently, the electoral device becomes larger than its original
purpose designed for selecting decision-makers. In Trinidad, it was
charged that elections became an arena of contesting identities enmeshed
in a threat of ethnic domination.
When general elections occurred in Trinidad and Tobago
(Trinidad hereafter) on December 16, 1991, few citizens doubted their
right to select their representatives. Free and fair elections had taken
place since 1946 when universal adult suffrage was first introduced in
this former British colony in the Caribbean. After independence in 1962,
successive elections occurred regularly, and apart from one near fateful
20
Elections, Identity and Ethnic Conflict in the Caribbean:
The Trinidad Case
insurrectionary event in 1970 accompanied by a virtual election boycott
in 1971, political succession through the ballot became routine and has
been taken for granted. Trinidad became a showcase of democratic
practices to much of the outside world. Human rights appeared to be well
safeguarded and institutionally entrenched. Accompanying this positive
political outlook has been the relative prosperity for the million or so
citizens who benefited from the island's endowment of petroleum
resources. The high standard of living of the average Trinidadian was
reflected in a per capita income of nearly (US) $10,000 in 1980, an
amount that placed the country among the most prosperous states in the
Third World. Trinidadians indulged heavily in the ethos of a market
consumerist society.
Trinidad and Tobago like most Third World countries has
however suffered from the ravages of internal ethnic conflict.
Development has been derailed by uncompromising ethnic rivalry.
Elections have tended to be bound by competitive communal parties and
sectionally divided electorates. The upshot has been political instability
and a defect in the democratic process itself. While, the competitive
multi-party democratic system survived and ethnic electoral politics
"stabilized" around the dominance and rule of one of the sectional parties
without drawing overt and systematic extra-legal resistance by the
excluded ethnic groups, governance by the People's National Movement
(PNM) was, however, conducted in the context of a fractured public will;
one large communal section, protested against racial repression and
discrimination and offered less than token recognition to the legitimacy
of the ruling party. A veritable civil war was quietly enacted everyday in
routines that contained communal malaise.
It was not until December 1986 in the country's sixth post-
independence general elections that an unprecedented break was made
with the past patterns of conflict in Trinidad. On that occasion, a multi-
ethnic, multi-class party called the National Alliance for Reconstruction
(NAR) won the elections. Trinidad seemed to have broken out of the grip
of its double headed internal contradiction bound by invidious racial and
class antagonisms. In NAR, a rainbow regime of "one love" was installed
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in the cockpit of power. After five years of rule, NAR returned to the
electorate for a new mandate to continue to govern. But by 1991,
however, new discontents were unleashed in the society and the
"rainbow" consociation of inter-class and inter-ethnic amity was under
radical challenge. Strong ethno-communalist sentiments had re-emerged
in the wake of economic crisis and the attendant austerity measures that
the NAR introduced returned to haunt them in the 1991 general elections.
Was NAR's momentous triumph in 1986 only a temporary
aberration or was it long-lasting? In the 1991 elections then, a wider issue
with immense theoretical significance had been embedded. Was sectional
identity becoming erased by rational issue-oriented politics? Will
Trinidad point the way to other Third World countries in overcoming the
claims of communalism?
For many the results were long awaited to indicate whether the
old form of ethnic rivalry was surmounted and a radically new style of
cross-communal politics re-affirmed. Three major parties competed, two
anchored in the will of two largest ethnic communities, the other based
on cross-sectional appeals. In the 1986 general elections when the ruling
NAR dramatically breached all old patterns of ethnic electoral preference
in evicting from power the African-Creole based People's National
Movement (PNM) which had governed Trinidad since 1956, NAR's
victory signaled a new brand of politics pointing to the prospect of
primordial ethnic preference yielding to a rational electorate motivated
by pragmatic calculations of concrete self-interest.
In the 1991 elections then, the fear persisted that the experiment
in a popular cross-communal party which was attained in 1986 was
threatened and a new era of re-tribalized ethnic parties was at hand. Yet,
many hoped that this would not happen and that the electorate would not
return to primordial patterns of party preference and politics.
More than just re-electing office holders then were at stake in the
1991 elections. It was a critical election in the Caribbean. If a
communally-bound party were to win, then the promise of illegitimacy,
instability, and disunity awaited Trinidad. If NAR, even in its
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reconstituted weaker form as a multi-ethic party without a natural ethnic
electorate were to win instead, hope of cross-communal cooperation in
development was promised.
Since the 1991 elections, three new elections were called. We
shalllook at these three additional elections very briefly with most of our
attention focused on the elections of 1991. It will be useful before we
proceed to analyze and evaluate the results of the 1991 elections to give a
briefportrait of the Trinidad polity and economy.
B. TRINIDAD ANDTOBAGO:
AN INTRODUCTORY PORTRAIT TO THE ELECTIONS
The twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad hereafter)
independent since 1962 was first claimed and colonized by the Spaniards
on July 31, 1498, until it fell under British control in 1797 where it
stayed until the mid-twentieth century. For about four hundred and fifty
years, Trinidad evolved mainly as a territorial appendage of and as a
dependent supplier of raw materials to its European metropoles.
Production of coffee, cocoa, cotton, and sugar was done under a mode of
plantation production that led to the implanting of an immigrant multi-
ethnic population. The indigenous Amerindian population was recruited
and eventually enslaved to meet the labor needs of the colonizers. The
Arawaks and Caribs, in the long trek of Spanish colonial control, unable
to adapt to the work regimentation of the plantations would be practically
decimated. The primary product grown was sugar but other exportable
plantation crops also included coffee, cotton, and tobacco. The labor
came from forced African servitude through the iniquitous slave trade.
When slavery was abolished in 1833, the colonists were forced to
find a new source of labor. Because both Trinidad and India were
colonies of Britain, this facilitated the recruitment of Indian indentured
laborers from India. Asian Indians (Indians hereafter) then came in
shiploads for several decades. By 1917, when the Indian indenture
scheme was terminated, some 144,000 Indians were imported into
Trinidad. Most were Hindus from north India, but about 15 % were
Muslims. Indians emerged as the backbone of the plantations. While
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some Indians opted to return to India at the end of their indenture, most
chose to remain as permanent residents of the colony. By 1875, about
87 % of the sugar plantation laborers were Indians. Autonomous Indian
villages arose around the plantations and Indians became essentially rural
dwellers. The emancipated Africans developed contempt for the Indians
who had willingly submitted themselves to the degrading regimen of the
plantation. Indians in turn regarded the Africans as "outcasts" who had
readily accepted and acculturated to the ways of the oppressor. Herein,
then, would the first seeds of Indian-African antipathy be born. Most
Africans migrated to the urban areas where they evolved as a skilled and
semi-skilled proletariat and adapted to English ways.
Thus then, with the arrival of Europeans, Africans, Indians, and
Chinese and added to by a significant group of "mixed races", would a
plural multi-ethnic society be forged in Trinidad. African slavery and
Indian indenture served as the twin bases on which the successful
colonization of the tropical terrain occurred. A workforce of culturally
different immigrants from the Old World was recruited to labor on
plantations which provided the nucleus for a new society. Partly because
of the superior economic and military power of the Europeans, a color-
class stratification system evolved whereby things English and white
prized were and became the measure of social value.
The pluralized ethnic structure which came into being in Trinidad
was reinforced by multiple coinciding cleavages expressed in patterns of
occupation, residence, and cultural orientation among each of the
segments in the immigrant population. By the turn of the 19thcentury, a
communally oriented multi-ethnic society was fashioned; with some
modifications, most of its essential features have persisted into the
present. While European influence has remained pre-eminent (Europeans
are collectively called French Creoles today and they are nearly all
locally born and bred), inter-communal rivalry between Africans (locally
called "Creoles") and Asian Indians (called "Indians") would emerge as
the dominant feature in inter-ethnic relations in the state. In addition, a
complex of almost exclusive ethnically bound cultural and social
voluntary associations has emerged to consolidate the split personality of
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the new order. Negative stereotypes held of each group by others
constitute the main medium of inter-ethnic perceptions which in turn
provide a vocabulary of racial slurs that reinforce ethnic exclusivity.
While sugar production is relatively old, petroleum was
discovered at the turn of the twentieth century and slowly emerged as the
dominant primary producing export product eclipsing sugar, coffee, and
cocoa. Over centuries of evolution as a producer of primary products for
an export market, the economy of contemporary Trinidad reflects this
historical imprint by its heavy reliance on oil, gas, petroleum and sugar
for its survival. In a peculiar twist of events that can only happen in a
plural society, ethnic identity and the economy became enmeshed: sugar
production has come to be associated with the Indians, oil with Creoles,
and big multi-national business corporations with French Creoles. In the
twentieth century, the Trinidad economy attained new levels of
complexity registered especially in the development of a large public
sector employing about 60,000 public servants about 70 % ofwhom were
Creoles and mixed races. Indians did not remain with sugar even though
most sugar workers and planters are still Indians. Most Indians have
gravitated into small businesses, trades, teaching, and the professions.
Politics in Trinidad, like the economy, developed in terms of the
underlying ethnic delineations in the state. When mass representation and
a party system became a part of democratic politics after centuries of
colonial rule, the fragmented social structure shaped political orientation
and partisan preference. Ethnically based parties emerged and
exacerbated communal tensions. Inter-ethnic distrust would render
nation-building and economic development problematic. In the 1950's,
two major parties, the People's National Movement (PNM) and the
Democratic Labor Party which would later become the United Labor
Front and in the contemporary political scene became the United
National Congress were organized mainly around the Creole and Indian
communities respectively. The Creole-based PNM party headed by Dr.
Eric Williams led the colony to independence in 1962 and governed the
state through several elections until December, 1986. During the long
period of PNM rule, the Indian community bitterly complained about
25
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ethnic discrimination as attested to by the exclusion of Hindus from
cabinet appointments and the overwhelming stacking of the civil service
by Creoles.
When oil prices were high in the 1970's, Trinidad enjoyed
unprecedented prosperity and the PNM became entrenched. In the
1980's, however, with the plummeting of oil prices, a steep recession led
to the eviction of the PNM from power in the 1986 general elections. The
victorious party was called the National Alliance for Reconstruction
(NAR). It was constituted of an unprecedented alignment of disgruntled
Indians and Creoles. It represented that elusive multi-ethnic formation
which had so far failed to appear in Trinidad's modem mass politics.
NAR called itself "rainbow party" bound by "one-love". Its ethnic unity
was short-lived, however. About one year later the NAR was fatally split
between an Indian group led by Basdeo Panday and the Creole group led
by Prime Minister Robinson.
c. THE 1991 ELECTIONS
a. The Structure of the Elections:
Parties, Issues and the Campaign
In the 1991 elections, the main actors competing for office
consisted of three parties: the (National Association for Reconstruction)
NAR, (People's National Movement) PNM and (United National
Congress) UNC. Two main parties, the UNC and PNM, erected around a
core of Indian and African constituents respectively, had dominated
Trinidad' s politics since 1961.
The PNM was launched in 1956 as an anti-colonial mass
movement by historian academic Dr. Eric Williams. The party's charter
proclaimed a commitment to promote equity in a multi-racial society:
"We are rather a rally, a convention of all and for all, a mobilization of
all the forces in the community, cutting across race and religion, class
and color, with emphasis on united action by all the peoples in the
common cause". The promise of a cross-cultural and inter-ethnic society
under PNM rule for seven successive terms of office covering thirty
26
Elections, Identity and Ethnic Conflict in the Caribbean:
The Trinidad Case
years of uninterrupted rule was however belied by the fact that the party
became preponderantly uni-ethnic in composition and support.
From a small nucleus then in 1956, the PNM would become
bigger beginning with its victory in the 1956 general elections in which it
won 13 of 24 seats. The PNM led the colony to independence in 1962
and for six consecutive parliamentary terms served as the ruling party
until 1986. To the African communal core, the PNM while in power
would add the Mixed Races, Europeans ("French Creoles"), Chinese, and
a significant slice of the Indian middle class. Wielding undisputed
paramountcy over the polity and society in its control over jobs,
contracts, and other values, the PNM at once became a tower of strength
and place of reverence in periods of plenty and a source of all sin in times
of adversity. An immense target, it was easily bludgeoned into
humiliating submission in 1986 when it was only able to obtain only 3
out 36 seats in Parliament. In the wake of steep economic decline, the
PNM was weakened and widely perceived as corrupt and incompetent.
Dr. Williams had died in 1981 and the loss of his charismatic presence
coincided with the degeneration of economic well being in the society.
Indians as a whole saw the PNM as an instrument of ethnic repression
and in 1986 they would join forces with other dissident groupings in
dislodging the PNM from power.
NAR, the ruling party from 1986 to 1991, led by ANR Robinson
was formed in 1986 from three opposition fragments pitted against the
PNM. The three elements were: the United Labor Front which was the
Indian-based mass party led by Basdeo Panday; the Organization for
National Reconstruction which was a multi-ethnic middle class party led
by former PNM Stalwart Hudson Phillips; and the Democratic Action
Congress (DAC) led by another ex-PNM cabinet member, ANR
Robinson. Although, according to its constitution NAR was a unitary
party in which its constituent components had submerged their respective
identities, in practice it was a loose confederal combination of
unintegrated parts. The PNM was their common enemy and raison
d'être.
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In the historic December 1986 elections, NAR served itself up as
the "rainbow party" committed to "one love" in the promise to replace
the African-based PNM with a merging of identities in an authentic
multi-ethnic party. In Robinson, an African leader was found; in Panday,
an Indian leader was recruited; and in the ranks of the ONR leadership
the Mixed Races and French Creoles had representation. In bringing the
final party into existence, no formula was agreed upon to share the spoils
of power should NAR win. In fact, not even NAR itself expected to win.
NAR did win by a margin of 33 seats to 3. But for a variety of
personality, ethnic, and ideological reasons, the ULF segment led by
Panday was expelled from the NAR just one year later throwing not only
the ruling in crisis but the nation which was euphoric in giving NAR a
decisive victory.
The United National Congress led by Panday was a direct
descendant from NAR but in fact it had a larger pedigree going back to
the mid-1950s. In this continuity, the UNC owed its lineage to Indians
who constitute one of the two largest ethnic communities in Trinidad and
who were organized from the very inception of mass politics in
anticipation of self-government in the 1950s. The UNC's votes were
concentrated in the central sugar growing plains where Indian parties
since 1961 have been able to obtain about a third of the parliamentary
seats.
The essentially three-way contest was a mixture of old and new
motifs in Trinidad's politics. The PNM and UNC represented the old
ethnic politics; these parties could count on a solid core of ethnic
constituents to vote for them. The NAR represented, at least in its initial
formation in 1986 to 1988 prior to the expulsion of Panday, a genuine
multi-ethnic grouping that had significantly disengaged many voters
form their traditional cultural partisan moorings. The original NAR
phenomenon with its multi-ethnic following had caused a new model of
party representation to be founded in Trinidad. While the old parties
nominally had claimed multi-ethnic constituents, the fact remained that
Africans and Indians under the old order remained loyal to their
respective parties. By the victory of the original NAR in December 1986,
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a new example of cross-communal partisan coalition had emerged as the
method towards electoral victory.
Hence, in 1991, both the PNM and UNC undertook strenuous
efforts to refurbish their manifestoes, rhetoric, and frontline personnel to
reflect multi-ethnicity. The PNM called itself a "new PNM" attempting
to distance itself from the ethnic bias, corruption and incompetence of the
PNM under the old guard that was defeated in 1986. The UNC also
attempted to present a multi-ethnic front. This new multi-ethnic image in
PNM and UNC was a hard act to maintain, however, especially as the
elections heated up and the election dateline approached. The Robinson-
led NAR which had also sought to refurbish its tarnished image after the
Panday expulsion was seen by many as the party with a cross-section of
ethnic support potentially able to win as it did in 1986. NAR, however,
did possess its own tinge of ethnicity, however, seen by many as the
party ofmainly upper middle class Mixed Race persons as well as French
Creoles to which was added parts of the African and Indian middle class.
b. Ethnic Appeals and the Campaign
In a state constituted of several communal sections which bore
strong antipathies towards each other, the ethnic identity factor always
hovered as one of the most fearful and powerful forces that could have
convulsed the society into total turmoil. In the 1961 general elections in
Trinidad and Tobago, communal strife had reached unprecedented
proportions with the PNM charged with violent organized hooliganism
and the DLP with the threat of using arms. The African-East Indian
chasm ordinarily regulated in rituals of avoidance and formal courtesy in
normal daily interaction tended to deepen during elections in part
because the political parties were polarized along ethnic lines. After
1961, racial tensions abated although it persisted. The restraint in the
open use of racial appeals derived after the 1961 elections stemmed
mainly from the foregone conclusion that the PNM was the winner in all
future elections. Even so, the ethnic monster was not fully restrained as a
mobilizer of voters in the elections that followed 1961. It tended to be
subterranean and subtle but always present and salient. Since 1961, then,
a modus operandi had evolved in inter-party affairs between the two
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major ethnic parties so as to limit the expression of ethnic claims and
racial accusations publicly. In its place a new vocabulary and symbolism
had evolved that disguised the ethnic discourse in a contrived theatre of
overt tolerance.
In the 1991 elections, this ethnic disguise was evident but at times
it bolted the barriers of ritual restraint thrusting into the open and
threatening to destroy the seeming tolerance in the society. Towards the
final days of the elections, one newspaper reporter noted that the
"Medusa of the elections - race, ethnic division - has reared its forked
tongued head quite high this time,,4. Another of the major papers also
pointed "persistent allegations of racism"s. The parties exchanged
charges and counter charges of covert ethnic appeals. But what was clear
as one reporter noted was that they were all doing it, "ironically, at a time
when all the parties in the race has been seeking to convince the
electorate that each is the only true national party,,6. The seeming
hypocrisy in this habit of saying one thing and doing another in the area
of race could easily explained by the conventions of outward ethnic
probity and inward racial rivalry that had evolved in Trinidad and
Tobago.
In the 1991 election campaign, the vocabulary of ethnic appeals
that attempted to parade in disguise took many forms but fooled no one.
Panday spoke of "alienation" as one of his foremost issues
euphemistically referring to alleged racial discrimination by the PNM
and the NAR governments against East Indians. Manning spoke of the
need of a "caring" regime referring to the alleged disproportionate share
of adversity that Black voters experienced during the NAR term in office.
Robinson spoke of "dependency syndrome" in his condemnation of
alleged PNM practices that reduced many Africans to conditions of
dependence on political patronage for survival instead of dignified
development. NAR also spoke of "participation" in his appeal to East
4 G. Alexander, "When Heaven Smiled", Guardian, 28/11/1991, p. 4.
5
"Call for Vigilance", Guardian, 12/12/1991, p. 8.
6 G. Alexander, art. cit.
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Indians to vote against the UNC which had kept them in futile opposition
in Parliament. The verbal disguises and other symbolisms assumed many
forms and variations. Sometimes they were open such as the effort of
each party to parade an ethnically mixed collection of candidates and to
discuss issues that addressed the needs of all communal sections. Panday,
for instance, representing Indians mainly, vigorously advocated programs
of economic amelioration to assist urban blacks. Manning pointed to a
"new" PNM. The verbal foliage that offered a front for inter-ethnic
equity served as an important ingredient in instilling ethnic camaraderie
among party workers on the campaign trail. Everywhere no effort was
spared to show East Indians and Africans sharing campaign platforms
and saying amicable innocuous things about national unity.
All of this overt symbolism and ceremony, however, was belied
by a different behavior at the grassroots level. The very fact that the
PNM and UNC canvassers tended to carry a map of supporters and non-
supporters defined in ethnic terms and which in turn governed their
canvassing strategies attested to the salience of ethnic identity in the
mobilization of electoral support. This resulted in a campaign structure
that was basically communalist. Indian canvassers for the UNC were
chosen to canvass in Indian homes and neighbors in the same way as
African canvassers for African areas and homes. Apart from a
pragmatism that informed such selectivity, there was also fear of
breaching territorial codes of personal safety. That apart, Indians and
Africans could not seriously convince each other that they could be
sincere about crossing the ethnic divide even when they were in the same
party. At the intimate level of canvassing involving entry into homes not
much needed to be said by canvassers to electors about the need for
communal solidarity and loyalty. The voter who breached these
principles of solidarity openly risked ostracism, even violence. This sort
of collective communal pressure served not only to reinforce communal
identity and solidarity but in the long run perpetuated the ethnic division
as the normal state of affairs in which to live, love and die in Trinidad. It
will be useful to look in some detail at how the campaign has been
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conducted since it is at this site of struggle that ethnic identity is
organized and mobilized.
The organizational format in campaigning for each party was
similar in structure but different in delivery capability and traditional
practices. The three major parties penetrated each constituency with their
basic "grassroots" party unit or group located around each polling
division. Each constituency had a number of polling divisions and each
had put in place a constituency executive group which in turn was sub-
divided into polling division units equipped with its own staff canvassers.
It was the task of each constituency party group to map comprehensively
its polling divisions so that a portrait of the ethnic, economic, and
religious characteristics of voters could be ascertained. These data serve
as the raw materials for identifying three categories of voters: "core" or
loyal supporters; marginals in need of conversion; and "die-hard"
opposition party supporters. As a matter of first priority, each party had
attended to its core supporters and thereafter focused its efforts on the
"marginals" or floating voters. Voters and constituency areas which are
perceived as constituting opposition "faithfuls" and strongholds tended to
be neglected in practice. As a result of this tactic of selective canvassing,
and in a number of cases party canvassers were openly afraid to enter an
area perceived as belonging to the domain of an opponent, most
constituencies throughout the country had not been criss-crossed
comprehensively by all the parties. In an election where ethnic preference
became salient, the consequence of this practice was the reinforcement of
old voting patterns. In the 1991 elections, the presence of NAR as a
multi-ethnic party without a "natural" traditional ethnic constituency
such as was associated with the PNM and UNC meant that the old
selective practices of ethnically directed campaign behavior were
partially breached but not so much by the PNM or UNC as by NAR in
desperate quest for votes wherever they could be found. The PNM and
UNC had to protect their old ramparts from NAR raids.
The method of access to each voter and household was through
individual house-to-house canvassing and small group, household and
neighborhood gatherings called "cottage" meetings. Parties such as the
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PNM had fashioned the "cottage" meeting into an effective tradition with
a semi-permanent cadre of grassroots party activists and homes always
available for activation and mobilization especially in loyal core areas. It
is at this level of intimate inter-personal communication that each party
had hoped to consolidate its support. When it seemed that NAR as the
ruling party with its access to a huge reservoir of resources was about to
outspend other parties at the level of the mass media campaign, the PNM
reacted by saying that it was going to deploy fifty grassroots canvassers
for every fifty dollars that NAR spent on advertisements. The PNM
bragged that it could mobilize as many as one hundred thousand
(100,000) canvassers and was aiming at getting their campaigners into
seventy five per cent (75 %) of households. Lacking funds, the UNC
similarly converted this deficiency into a virtue promising to minimize
buying mass media "propaganda" and depending more on "personal
touch". In every case, however, the parties realized that the campaign
canvassers was to be located at the very front line of their efforts. Often
canvassers came on "blitzes" moving as waves of small groups
sometimes in the company of the candidates calling on the homes of
voters for quick visits. Most often these were periodic superficial affairs
which were intended to convey the impression of a popular party
presence.
The mass of canvassers who made "sweeps" through a polling
division was often supplemented at a more intense level by solicitations
by community leaders. This technique was particularly intended for the
conversion of "marginals" and "floaters". In every constituency a roster
was maintained of community leaders such as schoolteachers, preachers,
businessmen, sports leaders, senior civil servants, and social workers,
many of these persons serving as officials in local clubs and socio-
cultural voluntary organizations. These were the party' s influential from
whom the party's polling and constituency committees were composed
and often times the source from which candidates were selected. Usually,
a party's candidate for a constituency was someone with a long list of
service in community organizations. Even where a candidate lacked these
credentials, he or she was still sold to the constituency in this wrapping
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of community service. Community leaders, constituting a critical tier of
citizenry, operated in a network exerting continuing influence on behalf
of the party at the grassroots. When a party sought to penetrate another' s
stronghold of support, often this was done at the level of community
leaders. During the 1991 elections, several of these persons long
associated with one or the other party, when converted, were paraded on
party platforms as proof of extensive party support.
The canvassers and community leaders were usually the carriers
of the party' s paraphernalia of buttons, T-shirts, posters, and messages.
They made the party literally visible in the constituency constantly
parading and placing on display all the physical symbols of the party's
campaign presence. The collection of party activists, party paraphernalia,
music, cottage meetings, and visible up and down movements especially
within areas that were already captured as well as small townships,
markets and shopping malls all added up to a formidable phalanx and in
some constituencies they engaged in fierce competition for party
allegiances at the micro-level of the campaign. The PNM, out of power
was able to devote full time to ongoing grassroots campaigning and
sustained this exercise of ongoing party activism in its basic form for
almost a year prior to the elections. The UNC was not able to do this
overtly or as comprehensively as the PNM mainly because it was
embroiled in its own internal party in fighting. But the UNC had its
network of canvassers and community leaders lying dormant for
activation as the election date came closer. NAR was able to recruit a
number of converts at the grassroots level from both the PNM and UNC.
Through a variety of programs sponsored by the government such as
National Service, YESS, ECHO, and cooperatives, NAR has assiduously
weaned away a number of PNM and UNC supporters. It seemed to many
observers that NAR had succeeded in a large number of areas in
displacing old voter loyalties through its assiduous activities among
community leaders at the grassroots. It was however, not clear how many
of these persons were real converts to NAR and how many enlisted for
jobs and patronage.
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At a macro level in support of the grassroots political
organizations were party advertisements and events which served to link
all the constituency and sub-constituency groups into an integrated
dynamic national unit. Among the activities of the macro party campaign
were mass meetings which were often attended by party activists from
other constituencies and on whose platforms speakers and candidates
from other constituencies appeared. The mass meetings tended to occur
at various levels ranging from individual constituency meetings to
regional and national gatherings. These mass gatherings were all
characterized by a level of theatre that maximized the party's image as a
popular, multi-ethnic, vibrant and optimistic organization. The staging
was marked by party music arranged for the occasion; the speakers were
well orchestrated so as to include local leaders and national figures, small
parochial issues and national debates, and in all cases, a major effort was
made to have a flamboyant display of party flags, buttons, and placards
in concentrated mass formation. The design of this show was often a
work of art high tech entertainment intended to lure everyone to come for
a social as well as a political treat. The idea was in part an image of party
popularity and strength.
Music was an integral and indispensable part of the campaign at
the macro level mass meetings. In a multi-ethnic country, the
accompanying tunes came from the respective cultural communities,
taking the form of tassa drumming and "chutney" tunes from the East
Indian section to "pan (steelband) beating" and "calypso, soca and kaiso"
songs from the African Creole section. One example that was well
reported by the press illustrated this combination at work: "Tassa drums
held sway. Near the podium a Jour Ouvert (Carnival) style 'engine room'
(rhythm section) supporting Hilda Goodial got ready to strike up.
Panmen rivaled tassa drums, beating iron with a vengeance. The group
rivals the tassa for attention and calls forth sinuous swivels and swiveling
gyrations from a head-tied East Indian lady"?
7 G. Alexander, "When Heaven Smiled", Express, 15/12/1991, p. 4.
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Some candidates composed their own tunes but each party had
adapted their songs for the occasion of the election and the themes of
their campaign. For NAR, it designed a special tune called "Attack with
Full Force" invoking the brave words that its leader Robinson had used
calling for the military counter support when he was held under guns of
his captors in the Red House (parliament) during the July 29th, 1990,
when some Muslims attempt to seize power in Trinidad and Tobago.
NAR had commissioned other calypsos such as "Robbie is the Boss and
Give Us Five", but he was not to be outdone by the PNM which had a
long history of coming up with catchy tunes such as "Not a Dam Seat for
Dem" that devastated its rivals in the 1981 general elections. In 1991, the
PNM designed "Never, Never Say NAR Again" and "Now is the Time",
among others. The UNC used the old NAR catch tune from the 1986
campaign titled "Vote Dem Out, Nani Wine" and a dub of Bob's
Marley's "Three Little Birds" accompanied by tassa drums. In all of
these cases Trinidad and Tobago's tradition of carnival and music came
in handy during the elections.
Another important aspect of the campaign at the level of mass
meetings was "picong" and "bacchanal". This local medium derived
from an oral tradition of story telling was a combination of humor, hate,
slander, sex and politics. Speakers engaged the crowd in "street theatre"
as they slurred the reputation of their adversaries by innuendoes and
picong that evoke emotional rapture, uncontrolled laughter, horror and
tears. It was expected from the crowd that they be served up with a form
of picong in exchange for the hours of listening to political propaganda.
Panday, the picong artist leader of the UNC expressed it thus: "When I
went to the Tunapuna meeting and I see the crowd on a high, I couldn't
go there and talk manifesto. They would pelt me with rotten egg. I have
to give them their picong and bacchanal,,8.
Each party had its own set of picong which it employed to
caricature its adversaries making even sacred partisan claim an object of
ridicule. Many of the stories were invented and assigned to some
8 K.D. Waterman, "No Laughing Matter", Express, 15/12/1991, p. Il.
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mysterious source and often they could irreparably injure the reputation
of candidates. Trinidad and Tobago's politics, however, especially during
campaigns for office is not a tea party but tends to be peppered as in the
1991 elections by rumor, innuendoes and gossip.
In order to bridle the excesses of "picong" as an established
custom from degenerating into open character assassinations and even
racial conflagration, attempts were made during the 1991 election
campaign to impose ethical standards. The Inter-Religious Organization
of Trinidad and Tobago, an ecumenical body representing all of the
major religious faiths in the country issued a set of guidelines as a code
of conduct to restrain the parties from election excesses9. NAR
announced that it was appointing a group of lawyers specifically to
litigate against any party casting defamatory aspersions on its candidates.
This became necessary in part because both PNM and UNC candidate
had intended to implicate NAR in drug trafficking in Trinidad and
Tobago. This, however, was not enough to constrain widely used
allusions to NAR as the alleged party of drug pushers who depended on
drug lords for campaign funds. Panday had openly called on NAR to give
all of its candidates a drug test. The UNC, however, utilized the idea of a
code of conduct to stifle the dissenters in its party ranks. The UNC code,
while calling for a voluntary banning of "bad talk" and "mauvaise
langue", in the same breath warned that no member of the UNC should
use abusive, offensive, or derogatory remarks about other members in the
presence of the publiclo. Caught in an internal wrangle that had
threatened to tear the party apart just before the elections, the UNC code
of conduct was seen as a ploy by Panday to limit the damage that this
intra party adversaries were threatening to unleash on his leadership.
At the macro-level, the parties orchestrated a media program
involving carefully designed market-oriented advertisements placed on
radio, television, and the printed media. While under the rules of the
Electoral Commission an individual candidate could not spend more than
9 IRQ, "Elections Code", Guardian, 01/08/1991, p. 13.
10G. Alexander, "28 days of Whirlwind Activities", Guardian, 15/12/1991, p. Il.
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five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) for campaigning, no limits were placed
on the expenditure of the parties. At the macro-level, then, the parties
expended large undisclosed sums to adorn their main leaders, and to
project their key issues and their main appeals. The relative financial
capabilities of the parties were often displayed at this level. How each of
the major parties combined these broad modalities in the repertoire of
campaign techniques in large part distinguished them as unique
organizations. NAR hired the firm Atlas Advertising which had been
employed to great effect in the 1986 campaign. The PNM hired the
services of two firms: UNO Advertising and All Media Productions Ltd,
while the UNC did not avail itself of any marketing agency. The NAR
media assault had outstripped that of the other parties which charged that
NAR lacked grassroots following and was intent on distorting through
mass propaganda and modem psychological methods the minds of the
electorate. NAR responded to the PNM charge arguing that it was the
PNM which had invented lavish campaign spending when it was in
power and that the only purpose of its hiring an advertising agency was
"to tell the truth about the NAR and about the Opposition's intentions"}}.
The PNM conceived its role in terms of a "crusade of foot
soldiers" to storm the electorate with a human wave assault because it
anticipated a blitz of flashy advertising and promotion messages from
NAR. The UNC lacking in the services of an advertising firm and relying
mainly on posters charged that the NAR and PNM media campaigns
were sponsored separately by the two main daily newspapers, the
Express and Guardian, respectively and by the large business
conglomerates. All the parties used these macro methods but NAR and
PNM hired public relations firms to craft their assault on the public
psyche.
NAR clearly relied heavily on an ample supply of mass media
methods more so than the other parties. Around its key issues, it isolated
certain topical words and phrases which were prominently exposed and
hammered into the minds of the electorate through a large number of
Il C. Sankar, «Men ys. Money», Express, 02/06/1991, p. 9.
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advertisements. For instance, the key words, phrases and sentences
include in reference to itself: Party of Performance; Efficiency and
Competent Management; Integrity; Thrust; One Love. These words were
so crafted that they soon could be used alone as symbolizing the NAR's
presence and image. With reference to the PNM which it saw as its chief
opponent, it employed a number of negative imagery: "Ready to Go
Bankrupt Again?", "If you want to fete Hire the PNM", "You Better
Keep Them Out", "Santa is Coming to Town", all ofthem focused on the
PNM's old record of excess spending and alleged corruption during its
tenure in office. The PNM aiming its arrow at the NAR used the
following sloganised words: "Sensivity", "We care", "Are you better off
today than in 1986?", "The tide has turned", all playing on the impact of
NAR's austerity measures. Much of the media attack was confined to the
NAR versus PNM polarity in the electoral contest. Cartoons and
Christmas carols were integrated into the media messages.
The UNC which conducted a late and comparatively low keyed
mass media attack decided to aim mainly at the NAR. This meant that
NAR was assaulted from two virile fronts simultaneously. It was argued
that the UNC and the PNM had a "sweet heart" relationship which meant
that they hardly criticized each other while lambasting the NAR together.
Whether this was deliberately orchestrated or not was not proven during
the elections (but admitted afterwards) but it occurred to the NAR's
discomfiture. The UNC assigned to itself the appeals that it was the
"Party of the People" and argued in a jingle the "UNC Time Had Come"
to run the government since the "PNM had its Day and NAR had its
Say". Some of these UNC advertisements appeared in the main weekly
newspapers during the very last week of elections. The UNC seemed to
have had the sympathy of the well distributed weekly, The Mirror.
Towards the final days of the campaign, the mass media macro
method assumed fulsome proportions so that the electorate was blanketed
by a collective assault that reduced the parties to certain skeletal symbols
and slogans which caricatured their total existence to a few gross
impressionistic outlines as complete organizations. NAR which was on
the ropes literally having been bludgeoned by both Opposition parties,
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resorted to apocalyptic innuendoes in the mass media suggesting in
notable advertisements which occupied full pages with only a few words
with the blank space depicting the end of the world for Trinidad and
Tobago should the PNM or a PNM and UNC coalition come to power.
In the highly charged atmosphere of an election campaign, with
each party engaging in batteries of dubious charges and counter charges,
it was difficult to contain the enter event to peaceful procedures. Further,
the stakes were high in the loss or gain of the apparatus of government
that included offices, jobs, contracts, prefennent, symbolic gratification
and above all power over the policy direction of the state. Fortunately,
even though an undercurrent of claims was advanced that the NAR was a
party of the privileged and the PNM and the UNC were parties of the
non-white proletariat, the partisan competition contest was not influenced
by starkly defined polarized ideologies and beliefs. Neither was race
overtly salient, even though the latter was to emerge as such in the final
days of the campaign. From all of this, the ground was set for a
moderately pitched campaign. Despite this, it was almost inevitable that
at some point the bounds of control would have been breached beyond
verbal bickering by violence and sabotage. In the 1991 elections some of
this did occur but failed to cumulate into a cataclysmic momentum and in
the end proved to be sporadic and controlled.
The first act of violence which initially contained ominous
portents occurred at Woodford Square, the country's traditional premier
public arena for speeches, demonstrations and similar mass political
events. NAR, the ruling party was launching its first major initiative in
the declaration of electoral war in the campaign for votes. A massive
crowd was gathered and all of the main luminaries of the party were in
attendance in a display of a well orchestrated theatre of music, applause,
and emotions. This was covered comprehensively by all the mass media.
NAR wanted to make a winning impression on the population. It was in
this initial sortie that NAR felt a tone would be established, and riding on
a recent poll that showed them ahead of all the other parties, it hoped a
trajectory would be triggered carrying it to victory. It was during the
critical speech by the Prime Minister Robinson, the NAR leader, that a
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huge fire was set ablaze on the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Building that adjoined Woodford Square. The conflagration significantly
derailed the entire NAR event as the raging flames brought a quick and
premature end to this major campaign event. The timing of the fire in the
midst of the speech by Robinson and the location of it in the building of
the Chamber of Commerce which only a week earlier had endorsed the
policies of the NAR government strongly suggested a scent of sabotage.
In the headlines of the newspapers the next day, NAR in fact laid blame
for the fire on political sabotage without naming the accused party. What
was significant was that an element of fear was injected in the election
campaign at its very outset. Fortunately, while the PNM dismissed all
oblique innuendoes that assigned blame to it, none of the parties pursued
the matter.
While the flames of the first political fire were allowed to die, its
effects were immediate in the sorts of security procedures that the parties
had put in place around their mass meetings and physical facilities. At
each of the major NAR meetings, for instance, a contingent of security
officers was situated so as to protect the event from sabotage and assault.
NAR again would experience a second disruption when at another major
meeting at the Midmarket Mall in Chaguanas in the heart of the sugar
belt, its electrical transmission system was sabotaged. The UNC, about a
week later, holding a meeting in the Fyzabad constituency experienced
an event similar to Woodford Square when a fire station was put alight
during the course of the meeting. The two fires accompanied by the
established party surveillance and security systems occurred separately
many days never assumed enough significance so as to divert the
electorate from the issues that were being discussed by the parties and the
heavy canvassing that was mounted throughout all the electorates. There
were two instances of shootings which drew some attention. In the
Laventille East Constituency, a NAR candidate was dragged out of his
house and shot in the head, and in the Oropouche Constituency, a
security guard around the house of the NAR Minister of Tourism was
shot. These events drew some attention but failed to trigger a shooting
war. The events were treated as aberrations.
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It was not until the final seven to ten days before polling
scheduled for December 16, that violence again asserted itself. It seemed
that certain constituencies in particular were more prone to excesses of
heckling, the defacing of party posters, throwing of missiles, and physical
acts of violence and intimidation. In the San Fernando West Constituency
the worst of these occurred when the NAR candidate Dr. Allen Sammy
was physically wounded by stone throwing. It was here also that the
PNM charged that a group of its activists while putting up posters were
beaten and wounded by NAR partisans. There were isolated cases of
beatings such as occurred when an elector heckled the woman PNM
candidate in the Port of Spain South Constituency and when similarly a
person was beaten when heckling the NAR candidate in the Tabaquite
Constituency. It was these little events which had begun to occur more
frequently towards polling day that led one of the two major daily
newspapers to take note and warn that "suddenly a series of disturbing
and unsavory incidents is threatening to mar the elections campaign just a
few days before the balloting,,12.
While it was true that violence was sporadic during the campaign
and never got out of control, it is important to point out that an aura of
threat violence hovered over the elections. Prime Minister Robinson
threatened at one stage to invite international observers to witness the
elections in part to deter flagrant efforts to turn the election campaign
into a zone of turmoil. NAR in particular, felt it was not likely to
withstand the combined physical assault from both the PNM and the
UNC, even though it seemed clear, as the PNM leader had indicated that
it was not in the best interest of the PNM to provide an excuse for the
NAR to postpone the elections. This was especially critical to the PNM
when one week before the elections, all polls indicated that the popular
tide had turned in its favor. The PNM, confident of victory, feared that
NAR would call off the elections should violence rear its ugly head. Over
and over again the PNM leaders strongly advised their followers to stay
calm.
12
« Call for Vigilance », art. cit., p. 8.
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If physical violence did not emerge in a sustained and cumulative
manner so as to mar the election campaign, the same could not be said of
the ethnic and racial factor.
The efforts of NAR as a party without an ethnic base, even
though it seemed to have solidarity-type support among French Creoles
and well-offmixed races suggesting an "ethnic" following, were aimed at
breaking the ethnic hold on traditional political preferences of the
electorate. In a campaign that progressively shifted away from the overt
rational discourse over issues towards an intensification of emotions
around communal solidarity, the NAR almost collapsed in the finallap of
the election race. The mass meeting held by the UNC at Aranguez Park
and by the PNM at Constantine Park two days prior to polling day were
overwhelming uni-ethnic in composition and showed how voter
allegiance had crystallized around ethnic preference. By comparison, the
final NAR meeting at Woodfort Square, although mixed and middle class
in composition, lacked the electricity and collective verve that marked
the virtual "tribal" meetings of its opposing rivals. It seemed as if the
winds had been emptied out of NAR's sails. None of this happened,
however, by abandoning the overt trappings and vocabularies of inter-
ethnic amity.
The election campaign had culminated in an unequivocal
assertion of ethnic solidarity13. It seemed clear that with the parties
rapidly approaching the winner's line, in that moment of truth all
flirtations with inter-ethnic unity that had exited in a twilight zone of
theatre were momentarily set aside for a primordial communion with the
ancestral party. This emotion was always there at the inner concealed
level of the campaign although its symbols and official party double-
speak solicited its sympathies. Once the polls one week before the
elections unanimously showed that the PNM was likely to be the winner
13 See Ralph Prerndas, "Identity in an Ethnically Bifurcated State: Trinidad and
Tobago", in Ethnonational Politics edited by Steve Fenton and Stephen May, London,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
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gaining its votes from the African electorates, this literally triggered an
overt stampede for ethnic cover by the electorate.
c. Analysis of the Election Results
The most significant data in the 1991 elections results show that
in an essentially tripartite contest for thirty six (36) seats, the PNM
obtained twenty one (21) seats, the UNC thirteen (13) seats and the NAR
two (2). The number of votes cast for the three parties were PNM:
234,234; UNC: 151,051; and NAR: 126,910. It was a relatively
indecisive result in that no party obtained an absolute majority of the
votes cast. The results also suggest the existence of deep divisions in the
society marked by persisting ethnic cleavages as well as class
dichotomies. Very small margins of victory occurred in a number of
constituencies pointing to ambiguity in the PNM victory at a time when a
more overwhelming support is needed to cope with the austere economic
conditions facing Trinidad.
The 1991 results could be largely explained by a pattern of ethnic
preference in voter choice. This was however only an approximate
pattern with many interesting variations caused by the fact that the
electoral competition was conducted by three main parties of which only
the traditional two, the PNM and UNC, were clearly anchored in their
respective ethnic communities. The NAR was not ethnically rooted in
any constituency; it was essentially a middle class party that had cut
across the ethnic divide. Hence the class factor also played an important
part. In Tobago East and Tobago West, NAR won its only seats by
resounding majorities. Tobago however is a separate kettle of fish from
Trinidad. Under NAR's leader ANR Robinson, the island had effectively
severed its old PNM attachment and replaced it with an assertive
Tobago-centric sub-national collective identity. Hence the NAR vote in
Tobago was particular to the island and independent of the party's
performance in Trinidad where NAR operated in full competition with
the other parties in a multi-ethnic structure. In Trinidad, NAR failed to
win a seat in the 1991 elections.
The defeated PNM in the elections of 1986 obtained only 3 out 36
seats in Parliament accounting for 32 % of the votes which in a system of
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proportional representation would have earned them about 12 seats out of
the 36. The PNM votes in 1986 were constituted almost entirely of Afro-
Trinidadians in the lower income bracket. It is this cluster that can be
legitimately called the "core" traditional PNM group that assumed the
form of a permanent popular fixture. To discover the analogous Indian-
based UNC core, it is necessary to go back to earlier elections prior to
1981 such as the one in 1961, when the Indians as a cohesive group
confronted the other communities in an intense electoral contest. In the
1962 elections, the Indian-based party, the Democratic Labor Party,
obtained 42.2 % of the votes, a figure that approximated the 42-43 % that
constituted the Indian population of Trinidad. In both the traditional
Indian and African parties, the "core" is often conceived as constituted
predominantly of about 80 % of lower income persons. It is the middle
stratum that is most likely to "float" and it is this middling inter-ethnic
cluster that has given rise to parties such as the ONR in 1981 and the
NAR in 1991 (the ONR popular vote in 1981 was 22.2 %). The NAR of
1986 did inherit the ONR group of 1981, but it also succeeded in
attracting a wide class base of supporting in its victory over the PNM in
1986. In 1991, the NAR was reduced again to its 1981 ONR selfin many
salient respects, and the results of 1991 uncannily resembled the results
of1981.
Some of the anticipated NAR victories were projected for
traditionally solid UNC Indian electorates. Included among these were
notably Chaguanas, Tabaquite, Caroni East, St. Augustine, and Siparia.
Had NAR succeeded in those constituencies, it would have severed the
ethnic bond in voter preference especially located in the sugar belt and
could have led to a radical re-definition of Trinidad's politics as
traditionally known. In a number of solid PNM electorates, a similar set
of projections were made that included the Diego Martin seats, Arouca
North, Arima, and at times even suggestions that two Port of Spain seats
which are in the PNM's "sugar belt" would yield to NAR's aggressive
campaigning incursions. Had NAR succeeded in penetrating the solid
PNM and UNC homelands, then for the first time in the Third World, a
conversion from ethnic to class politics would have been achieved. NAR
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had hoped that its appeal to performance in a number of constituencies
where it did in fact initiated tangible community programs and employed
large numbers ofunemployed persons in short term projects that by these
criteria it would win votes and overcome open and surreptitious appeals
to primordial instincts. In the end, in the heat of the contest, race
overcame class criteria by substantial margins.
The NAR ratios cannot be easily dismissed as a passing
phenomenon however. In 12 out of 34 constituencies in Trinidad, NAR
obtained 25 % or more of the votes cast. In 18 out of Trinidad's 34 seats,
NAR obtained the second largest votes. Put differently taking Tobago
into consideration, in 20 seats or over 50 % of the constituencies, NAR
was either the first and second contender in only 19 seats. In most
constituencies, the contest was between NAR on one hand and the PNM
on the other. These included most notably cases such as Chaguanas,
Diego Martin East, Tabaquite, St. Joseph, Princes Town, St. Augustine
and Pointe-à Pierre. In nine cases including Nariva, Fyzabad, Pointe-à-
Pierre, Ortoire-Mayaro, Princes Town, St. Joseph, Tabaquite,
St. Augustine, and Tunapuna, it was the NAR vote that prevented an
outright majority victor and provided the basis for some closely fought
struggles. In the very last week of the elections after the NAR campaign
succumbed to the combined assault of the PNM and UNC, it was only
then primordial instincts gained momentum that the contest became one
between the PNM and UNC, and the results became a forgone
conclusion. Up to three weeks prior to the elections, the results predicted
by aIl local pollsters and political commentators attested to a highly fluid
contest. No one could and did predict the results accurately.
D. THE 1995 ELECTIONS
On December 5, 1995, new elections were unexpectedly called in
Trinidad by the ruling PNM. Contrary to the expectations of the ruling
party, it lost the elections to the effort of the UNC and NAR. In the 36-
member House of Representatives, the PNM obtained 17 seats, the UNC
17 seats, and the NAR 2 seats. The NAR had become an essentially
Tobago-based party led by Mr. Robinson. In part, the loss of the PNM
stemmed from the fact that not enough of its supporters came out to vote
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as against the greater mobilization of the UNC. The UNC won narrow
victories in two constituencies in Trinidad and therefore was able to
equal the number of seats that the PNM obtained. The UNC and the NAR
overcame their differences when Mr. Robinson, the NAR leader willingly
acceded to the leadership of the new coalition under Indian leader,
Basdeo Panday. The significance of the new dispensation as shaky as it
was pointed to the possibility of a renewal in inter-ethnic harmony. This
however was not too likely since the Creole-based PNM was not part of
the coalition government which means that the new Indian-led
government has African support only form Tobago, the home of
Mr. Robinson. In effect, the fundamental bifurcation and the underlying
ethnic animosity in the society were not reconciled in the new
government. A more viable inter-ethnic formation was one that must be
based on UNC-PNM collaboration. The UNC's invitation to the PNM to
join the new government was rejected leaving the new regime standing
mainly on the stilt of one ethnic group. It will useful to briefly examine
the 1995 elections.
On November 6, 1995 when voters went to the polls for the
seventh time since independence in 1961, most observers predicted a
normal event in a victory for the predominantly African-based ruling
Peoples National Movement (PNM). In what turned out to be a
watershed election, the ruling PNM was dramatically ousted from power
and replaced by the predominantly Indian-based United National
Congress (UNC) in coalition with the smaller party, the National
Association for Reconstruction (NAR) making it the first time that an
Indian acceded to the Prime Ministership.
In 1995, the essentially two-way contest was a mixture of old and
new motifs in Trinidad's politics. The PNM and UNC represented the old
ethnic politics; these parties could count on a solid core of ethnic
constituents to vote for them. In 1991, NAR was reduced to a shadow of
itself as most of its 1986 Indian and African supporters returned to their
ethnic camps in the PNM and UNC. In 1995, in an electorate of 837,453
eligible voters, seven parties mounted 114 candidates (with no
independent candidate since 1956) for the 36 seats in the National
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Assembly. Of the 36 candidates that the PNM put up, 15 were Indians,
1 White, and the others Africans and Mixed Races. Only one of the
PNM's candidates in the Arouca South constituency could be regarded as
a sure win while three in St. Joseph, San Juan-Barataria, and San
Fernando West were given a fair chance ofwinning. Of the 34 candidates
that the UNC put up, 18 were Indians, 1 White and the others were
Africans and Mixed Races. None of the African and Mixed Races UNC
candidates was placed in a safe UNC stronghold.
The most significant datum in the 1995 elections shows in a 36-
member House of Assembly a tie in the seats obtained by the two major
parties, 17 for the PNM and 17 for the UNC. NAR captured the
remaining 2 seats and therefore held the balance of power. In the past,
from 1961 to 1986 and from 1991 to 1995, the PNM won with
convincing majorities; in 1986 when the NAR won it obtained 33 out of
the 36 seats. A tie was unprecedented and ushered in for the first time the
politics of post-election coalition formation. The popular votes received
by the main parties showed that no one received a majority of the votes
cast. The tiny parties that contested the elections all lost so badly that
they lost their deposits. Voter turnout was 63.17 %; in 1991 it was
63.39 %. Of the voters who cast their ballots, the PNM received 48.35 %,
an increase of 3.04% from 1991; the UNC got 45.31 % an increase
16.01 % from 1991; and the NAR 4.71 %, a decrease of 19.72 % from
1991. While these results underscored the polarized ethnic partisan
preferences of the population, just as significantly it undeniably
demonstrated that the losses of the NAR party were overwhelmingly
gained by the UNC. This was reflected in the increase of the UNC
parliamentary seats from 14 to 17. The gains by the UNC were most
profound in a handful of critical constituencies where Indian!African
ratios were close.
To an overwhelming degree, ethnic identity determined voter
choice in 1995 unlike the 1991 elections when about 15 to 20 % of the
population evinced ambivalence as reflected in the NAR vote (24.43 %),
which apart from Tobago was of multi-ethnic derivation. For nearly all
the constituencies except 10, the presence of overwhelming
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concentrations of either Indians or Africans pre-ordained the outcome.
15 seats were strongly PNM and 9 UNC with clear ethnic majorities.
Together these account for 24 seats and given that the two Tobago seats
are personalistically controlled by the NAR leader, Robinson, this leaves
10 seats up for grabs. It would be these 10 constituencies that would
decide whether the UNC or PNM won an election. In turn, in these
10 seats, in the 1995 elections, it was the structure of the split of the NAR
vote to the UNC and PNM which would substantially determine how
these seats went.
Given that the NAR had been rendered virtually impotent in 1995
in the Trinidad constituencies resulting in a two-way race between the
UNC and the PNM, how the 1991 NAR support was split between these
two parties was absolutely crucial to the outcome of the elections.
Because of the large Indian presence in 4 of the 10 marginal
constituencies, Pointe-à-Pierre, Nariva, St. Augustine, and Princes Town,
given an emasculated NAR in 1995, it was almost a foregone conclusion
that the UNC would take these seats with only a small fraction of the
1991 NAR support. Hence, to the 9 safe UNC seats must be added the
additional 4 for a total of 13 seats, meaning that going into the 1995
elections the PNM had 14 sure seats, the UNC 13, and the NAR 2. That
left 6 seats in the role of arbiter of the final outcome, namely, Tunapuna,
St. Joseph, Fyzabad, San Juan Barataria, Ortoire-Mayaro, and San
Fernando West. In the end, the PNM would take 2 ofthese, Tunapuna by
a margin of244 votes and San Fernando West by 1,288 votes. The UNC
would take the remaining 4, two by small margins (St. Joseph by 614
votes and Ortoire-Mayaro by 900) and two by more substantial leads
(Fyzabad by 2,197 and San Juan Barataria by 1,183).
The 17-17-2 result ("a state of betweenity" as it was referred to)
imposed the demand for a coalition government, the first in Trinidad and
Tobago's history. Robinson and NAR who were comprehensively
defeated in 1991 held the balance with their two Tobago seats. While it
was true that the UNC and NAR leaders met prior to the elections and
agreed to cooperate in the defeat of the PNM, the arrangement was very
informal and incomplete in part because of the improbability of
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vanquishing the formidable and well financed PNM, even in attaining a
minimal 17-17-2 result. To be sure, Panday just about a week before the
election polls had publicly predicted a 17-17-2 result even though all the
public opinion projections declared the PNM a foregone winner. After
the vote, Robinson now holding the balance in the face of no firm
undertaking to join the UNC in forming the next government, the country
was thrown into two days of speculation about the shape of the next
government or whether the electorate had to return to the polls. Robinson
and Manning however were not on good personal terms.
The UNC-NAR coalition acceded to power on December 8 with
Panday as Prime Minister and Robinson as "Minister Extraordinaire", an
ambiguous title. The coalition agreement which was made public
proposed that the PNM secret arrangement with the Tobago House of
Assembly on devolution be set aside and a new formula be enacted
around the recommendations of House Paper No.6 of 1978 under which
Tobago would be accorded substantial self-government. In effect, this
would consolidate Robinson's base in the greater autonomy of Tobago.
Calling itself a coalition "party of partners" and not a fusion of parties,
the agreement also contained provisions for resolving inter UNC-NAR
conflicts and consolidating their cooperation.
The Panday-Ied coalition government which brought for the first
time an Indian and a trade unionist to power potentially represented
striking if not radical departures from the past. In particular, the
ascension of an Indian to the Prime Ministership carried the greatest
anxiety especially for the African community long accustomed to the
idea of a Creole chief executive as a sort of rightful inheritance. Above
all, the future of the UNC-Ied coalition would be at the mercy of African-
Indian relations. The fact of an Indian Prime Minister was fraught with
symbolism of power and domination, an intangible factor of potentially
explosive implications in the proportions of an all out civil war. Much
nervousness and malaise prevailed in Port of Spain and the PNM
strongholds after the cliff-hanger election results were announced in
favor of the UNC. The very indecisiveness of the results generated
instability. While Panday was announcing that "it was time to love
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again" as he embraced with Robinson reminiscent of the "one love"
campaign that the two leaders had conduced in 1986 to bring the NAR to
power, the situation was tense and unstable throughout the country in the
wake of the election results.
E. RETURN TO ETHNIC PARTISANPOLARISATION:
THE 2000, 2001 AND2002 ELECTIONS
a. The 2000 Elections
In the 1995 general elections, a traumatic event had occurred to
the dominant African community when the leader of the rival Indian
section which had never captured power before unexpectedly won at the
polls. It seemed that a revolution had occurred and for a while the polity
hovered nervously on the brink of civil strife. While cool heads prevailed
and permitted the victorious party to complete its term in office, the
defeated party and its saddened cultural section vowed to reclaim power
in the elections of 2000. In part, it was this expectation, along with the
fear of the Afro-Creole losing power permanently and consequently
being ghettoized and dominated by its ethnic Indo-Creole adversary, that
imparted a special tension to the tenor of the elections. While the Afro-
Creole dominated party, the People's National Movement (PNM),
mounted a massive campaign charging the preponderantly Indo-Creole
party, the United National Congress, as hopelessly corrupt and
completely lacking in morality, more was at issue in the election
campaign that was shaping up as a surrogate of cultural warfare. The
Afro-Creole community which had traditionally controlled the
government and enjoyed the benefits of jobs and patronage from the
public bureaucracy, feared that another electoral loss to the UNC would
open the way to the takeover of its territorial preserve in the public
sector. Hence, the general elections were about both symbolic and
instrumental values which together suggested total stakes were at play
instead of limited issues and negotiable pragmatic differences.
Paradoxically, in this cultural contest, neither political party displayed
any program that appealed only to one community. Cross-cultural
presentations were the norm that was artfully cultivated as a façade that
51
Ralph R. PREMDAS
really fooled no one. Knowing it could count on their allegiance and
calculating that it needed about 15 to 20 % of the Afro-Creole vote to
win, the incumbent Indian-based UNC vehemently abjured any special
identity with the Indian community in its public campaign making its
message to the electorate: "Performance beats Ole Talk Anytime" and
"You Cannot take race to the Grocery Store".
In a House of Representatives constituted of 36 seats, the UNC
won 19, the PNM 16, and NAR 1, thus returning Panday as Prime
Minister for a second term, a feat that was not achieved since 1986. In an
electorate of 947,689, voter turnout was about 63 % not remarkably
different from similar general elections in recent years. The portion that
was received by the UNC was 307,537 and the PNM 276,202; this
compared favorably with the 1995 results in which the UNC got 240,372
and the PNM 256,159, that is, the defeated PNM in 1995 obtained more
votes than the UNC when both parties garnered 17 seats each. In 2000,
the UNC moved ahead of the PNM on popular votes in part because of
the new voters in 2000, the UNC obtained 67,000 while the PNM only
about 20,000. The UNC had grown not only in popular votes from 1995
to 2000 but also in seats from 17 to 19 while the PNM diminished from
17 to 16. The PNM however did make a breakthrough in Tobago, taking
since 1978 one of the two seats from the old bastion of the NAR.
The party dynamics in 2000 shifted significantly from 1995 when
the NAR played a pivot role taking both seats in Tobago and assisting the
UNC in taking a couple of seats in Trinidad, and above all in bringing
Panday to power when it formed a coalition government with the UNC14.
In 2000, NAR dropped out in Trinidad confining its campaign to Tobago.
During the tenure of the Panday-Ied coalition with NAR, the two parties
disagreed and the relationship fell apart but not before the Panday
government had successfully wooed two PNM members of Parliament to
its fold.
14Ralph Premdas, "Elections and Campaigns in a racially Bifurcated State", Journal of
Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1972.
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In the coalition deal, Robinson, the NAR leader, was rewarded by
Panday with the Presidency of Trinidad and Tobago in exchange for his
supporting Panday for the Prime Ministership. However, without its
leader, NAR practically fell apart, some of its functionaries siding with
the PNM but most with the UNC thereby becoming a splintered shattered
force in shaping the outcome of the elections of2000.
Ethnic identity preponderantly determines party preference in the
contest for the 34 seats in Trinidad. In an electoral system of first past the
post simple plurality, if the ethnic distribution of a constituency is known
before hand, then it is a foregone conclusion that either the PNM or UNC
will win. To be sure, there are some critical variations in this pattern
related to the presence of substantial numbers of Indian Muslims and
Mixed Races. Since NAR was formed in 1986, it tended to gamer to its
fold a substantial number of persons who were mixed ancestry, but in
2000, with NAR absent from Trinidad, these persons were left to decide
their new party affiliation. With regard to Indo-Muslims, they constitute
about 15 % of the total Indian population, most of whom are Hindus. In
the past, a substantial number of the Indo-Muslims voted for the PNM,
but in the past two elections this started to change in favor of the UNC.
In a couple of marginal constituencies where the African-Indian
population was close, the presence of Muslims as in the case of
Barataria/San Juan and San Fernando West proved decisive in favor of
the UNC in 2000. In any event, the impact of Indo-Muslims and Mixed
Races was important only in a few constituencies. By and large, for 29
out of the 34 electorates on the island of Trinidad, because of the
preponderance of either Indians or Africans, party victory for the UNC or
PNM was foreordained.
Five constituencies in Trinidad held the balance of power in the
outcome of the elections: Tunapuna, Barataria/San Juan, St. Joseph,
Ortoire-Mayaro, and San Fernando West. These five constituencies
became the targeted battleground between the UNC and PNM submitted
to intense artillery of campaigning pressure reaching saturation point in
the distribution of flyers, and door-to-door canvassing. In the 1995
elections, the UNC won three of these constituencies and the PNM two.
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In 2000, the UNC won them all. It was never clear however which seat
would have gone decisively for either party before the elections with
polls providing conflicting projections. Tunapuna and Barataria/San Juan
were fiercely contested. The PNM won the Tanapuna seat in 1995 by
only 250 votes and until very recently, the PNM had controlled the
Barataria/San Juan seat which has a high concentration of Indo-Muslims.
The marginal seat of San Fernando West which was won handsomely by
the PNM in 1995 was seen by most observers as a PNM sure victory only
to be disappointed by a huge swing in favor of the UNC. In all five of
these marginal constituencies, the UNC placed very powerful and
popular personalities as its candidate which probably accounted for a
small swing that was decisive.
With victory in the five marginal seats, the UNC compiled the
necessary 19 seats to give it an absolute majority in the House of
Representatives. The UNC won. Importantly, the UNC obtained all its
seats from island of Trinidad and unlike 1995 when it depended on two
seats from Tobago, it dispensed with the coalition assistance from its
sister isle, Tobago. The Trinidad-based victory by the UNC meant also
that the 17-17 tie that eventuated in 1995 and that gave Tobago the
balance of power now conferred on it autonomy in putting a government
in place without coalitions. Some analysts had predicted another 17-17
tie in 2000 which would have favored the PNM since the cordial
relationship between NAR and UNC had been destroyed. In the elections
on Tobago, the PNM did take one of the two seats and by a small margin
nearly won the other. Still that would have only given the PNM 17 seats
less than a majority to form a government.
Both the UNC and PNM won convincingly in the 29 Trinidad
electorates which had majorities of either Indians or Africans. There are
some important observations which emerge from the results in these
constituencies. As compared with 1995, the UNC obtained more votes in
2000. In particular, in four previously safe PNM constituencies - San
Fernando East, Toco-Manzanella, La Brea, and Point Fortin -, the UNC
made such significant inroads that these seats have been converted into
new marginal seats in the next elections. The safe UNC constituencies
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remained free from similar threats from the PNM. It was clear from all
these figures that the UNC was in the ascendancy while a clear decline in
the fortunes of the PNM was quite discernible.
Finally, what made the elections more intriguing than most was
that after the polling was completed and the UNC declared the winner,
the challenge by the PNM regarding the citizenship eligibility
qualifications of the two victorious UNC candidates to sit in Parliament
literally placed the outcome in abeyance pending the court challenge
which would take time. A court decision in the PNM favor could well
reverse the fortunes of the Opposition party turning it into the victor.
What would also assume a particularly grating post-election feature was
the charge that the UNC had engaged in extensive voter fraudulence
daubed "voter padding". Indeed, the PNM's leader, Patrick Manning,
declared the UNC government illegitimately in office because of the
alleged voter irregularity. The elections were not over then with the
casting of the last ballot and the counting of the last vote. Communal
tension rose high when these issues were compounded by the President
of the Republic, Arthur Robinson, refusing to accede to the nomination
of seven candidates supplied by the Prime Minister for appointment to
the Senate. The fact that the President was Afro-Creole and the Prime
Minister was Indo-Creole became the main prism through which the
Senate appointment issue was perceived by deeply ethnically divided
population. Engulfed by these uncertainties and threats by the Opposition
PNM to mount demonstrations, the UNC leader and Prime Minister
announced on television that there was a plot to overthrow his new
government. The nation palpably was tottering on civil and communal
strife.
b. The 2001 Elections
In exactly a year after the UNC victory on December Il, 2001,
the government of Basdeo Panday collapsed and new elections were
called. What triggered the downfall related to a succession issue in
anticipation of Panday' s retirement. The Prime Minister who was
68 years old and a survivor of triple heart bypass operation felt that the
UNC ought to undertake a democratic process of selecting his successor.
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He therefore called for a party primary on June 1, 2001 hardly suspecting
that the event would tear the UNC into factions that engaged in bitter
infighting. The upshot was that three parliamentary members calling
themselves Team Unity (TU) were expelled from the party and aligned
themselves with the Opposition PNM, and hence without a majority, the
UNC called new elections. In addition, the court case that challenged the
credentials of 2 UNC parliamentarians on the citizenship issue was not
going well for the UNC before the judiciary and there was a fair chance
that the UNC on losing the case would be in untenable position to
govern.
The issues in the campaign were very much the same as they were
for the 2000 elections, performance claimed by the UNC and cOITUption
and "voter padding" charged by the PNM, except in this case, Team
Unity constituted itself as a separate political party and entered the fray
draining off a small but significant number of UNC votes. The upshot
was that both the UNC and PNM received 18 seats creating an
unprecedented tie in the 36 member House of Assembly. The PNM had
succeeded in winning two additional seats (Tunapuna and Tobago East)
but still obtained some 19,341 votes than the UNC overall. Team Unity
failed to win a seat but it had taken away votes from the UNC in at least
one marginal constituency (Tunapuna) enabling the PNM to win a seat.
What was repeated in the elections was the ethnic voting pattern with
marginal mixed constituencies determining the final numbers of seats.
It was up to President Robinson to select one of the two party
leaders as the Prime Minister on the basis of whichever is likely to
command a majority in the evenly divided Parliament. Calling upon
Panday and Manning to agree on some sort of compromise to break the
deadlock and then failing to do so, the matter was left for the President to
decide. However, it is important to note that despite the stalemate, the
two parties did agree to a set of post-appointment actions and policies to
be implemented regardless of who got the final nod. President Robinson
unexpectedly appointed Patrick Manning Prime Minister. This event
caused an enormous outburst of protest from the UNC which felt that as
the incumbent government that was not defeated in the elections, it ought
56
Elections, Identity and Ethnic Conflict in the Caribbean:
The Trinidad Case
to have been re-appointed. In protest, Panday refused to accept the
position of Leader of the Opposition. With an 18-18 split, it was clearly
just a matter of time when new elections would have to be called again.
This was scheduled for October 2002.
c. The October2002 Elections
During its short tenure from December 2001 to October 2002, the
new PNM government appointed several Commissions of Inquiry to look
into its allegations of corruption and voter padding. In drawn out partisan
and biased public inquiries, it succeeded in severely tarnishing the image
of the UNC. In addition, the PNM in preparation for the next electoral
encounter spared no effort in spending public funds lavishly to endear
itself to the electorate especially voters in the marginal constituencies. In
a tense ethnically inflamed campaign, the election-weary electorate gave
the PNM victory with 20 seats and the UNC 16. Again, ethnic voting
preference predominated but this time for a variety of reasons the PNM
won more marginal constituencies than the UNC.
F. CONCLUSION
On a larger canvass, a more basic set of issues was engaged by
the general elections in Trinidad. Specifically, stemming from the
potential of ethnic conflict to frustrate efforts at development, should
openly competitive elections to secure a legitimate government be
retained? Elections in the plural societies of the Third World tend to
involve destructive collective communal struggles among sectionally
based parties15. Sir Arthur Lewis, the Caribbean Nobel Laureate,
identified communal conflict and identity politics as the single most
significant factor that inhibited Third World Development. Said Lewis:
"[. . .] each country contains several tribes, living at different economic
levels. Tribal consciousness and economic differences combine to
produce mutual antagonisms which menace the unity of the state,,16."The
15Ralph Premdas, «Elections and Campaigns in a Racially Bifurcated State », Journal
of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1972.
16w. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa, London, Allen and Unwin, 1965, p. 49.
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fundamental problem is neither economic nor foreign policy, but the
creation of nations out ofheterogeneous peoples"l?
Communal conflict tends to be built on several coinciding
cleavages such as culture, language, religion, race, etc. In Trinidad, the
ethnic matrices were erected around race, religion and culture. These
discrete features provided the boundaries of identity construction creating
communal compartments which are exploited during elections for office.
Democratic elections in an open system of discourses invite appeals for
vote based on ethnic identity. In the give and take of the electoral
campaign, negative ethnic stereotypes are often invoked and manipulated
for votes. Consequently, inter-sectional animosity and distrust rise to new
levels at election time. After the elections are over, the ethnic distrust that
was cultivated does not disappear but are retained as a residue on which
new fears are built. Hence, over several competitive open elections, the
level of ethnic fear grows in a game over which the spoils of victory
assume greater importance. In the zero-sum contest for votes, more than
just office and jobs are at stake, even important as these are. The arousal
of inter-ethnic fears over several successive elections tends to destroy the
basis of trust in a government captured by one or the other ethnic group.
Together then, the zero-sum structure of the electoral contest as well as
the increasing momentum of inter-ethnic fears over several elections
create the incendiary basis for an ethnic conflagration.
17 Ibid.
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ABSTRACT
Imported into Trinidad from
British roots, an environment
radically different in social structure
from Trinidad, the adaptation of the
electoral device to the multi-ethnic
society of Trinidad and Tobago has
left important questions unresolved
about the roles of representation,
identity, integration, and citizen
commitment to the political order.
The electoral system was
based on zero-sum competition for
popular support. In particular,
representation tends to become
communalized so that the party in
power symbolizes not the public will
at large but sectional solidarity and
ethnically particularized interests.
Citizen commitment is passionately
expressed but communally cleaved so
that only one section at a time
identifies with the governing regime.
The out-section is alienated. Hence,
elections elicit fearsome primordial
responses and deeply divisive fears in
culturally fractured states.
In a communally-divided
society lacking shared beliefs and
identities, all political structures
however neutrally designed tend to be
tainted and imbued with suspect
ethnic motifs and interests. Communal
identities are at stake for in defeat the
RESUME
Importé à Trinidad - dans un
environnement social radicalement
différent - à partir des racines
britanniques, le dispositif électoral, tel
qu'il a été adapté à la société
multiethnique de Trinidad et Tobago,
a laissé en suspens des questions
importantes relatives aux rôles de la
représentation, de l'identité, de
l'intégration et de l'implication
citoyenne dans l'ordre politique.
S'agissant du soutien
populaire, le système électoral était
basé sur le principe d'une compétition
à somme nulle. En particulier, la
représentation a tendance à être
communalisée, de sorte que le parti au
pouvoir incarne non pas la volonté
générale mais des solidarités et des
intérêts ethniques particularisés.
L'engagement citoyen s'exprime avec
passion, mais sur le fondement de
clivages communautaires, de sorte
qu'un seul groupe à la fois s'identifie
au gouvernement. Par conséquent, les
élections suscitent de redoutables
réponses primordialistes et des
craintes qui divisent profondément
dans des états culturellement
fragmentés.
Dans une société segmentée
et divisée, manquant de croyances et
d'identités partagées, toutes les
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vanquished may witness the
marginalization of its way of life.
Consequently, the electoral device
becomes larger than its original
purpose designed for selecting
decision-makers.
In Trinidad, it was charged
that elections became an arena of
contesting identities enmeshed in a
threat of ethnic domination. The
pivotal problem thrown up by
Trinidad 's multi-ethnicity in part
pertains to collective communal
interests and sectional identity. Each
ethnic section sees its interests
differently not only in relation to its
symbolic and cultural life but in
relation to claims to economic
resources. Each election that came
tended to raise anew all the
unresolved issues of ethnic equity. As
it happened in Trinidad, one ethnic
group in an essentially ethnically bi-
polar state had captured power and in
the perception of the other major
ethnic community instituted an order
that was ethnically repressive and
discriminatory.
An election campaign
assumed the form of identity rivalry
expressed in a collective communal
struggle in which the claims of each
community as a whole reignited anew
and expressed in uncompromising
terms. Repeated victory by one
sectional community over the other
was not accepted by the vanquished
group which withdrew its moral
support from the state.
structures politiques conçues pour être
neutres tendent à être viciées et
imprégnées de considérations et
d'intérêts ethniques suspects. Des
identités communautaires sont en jeu
car, dans la défaite, les vaincus
peuvent faire l'expérience de la
marginalisation. Par conséquent, le
dispositif électoral va au-delà de sa
fonction initiale qui est de choisir des
décideurs.
A Trinidad, les élections sont
devenues une arène où les identités
s'affrontent, sous la menace d'une
domination ethnique. Le problème
central posé par la multiethnicité
trinidadienne concerne en partie les
intérêts communautaires collectifs et
l'identité segmentée. Chaque
communauté ethnique voit ses intérêts
différemment, non seulement au
regard de sa vie symbolique et
culturelle, mais aussi par rapport aux
revendications portant sur les
ressources économiques. Chaque
élection a eu tendance à soulever de
manière récurrente toutes les
questions d'équité non résolues du
point de vue de l'appartenance
ethnique. Comme ce fut le cas à
Trinidad, un groupe ethnique dans un
Etat fondamentalement caractérisé par
une bipolarisation ethnique a capté le
pouvoir et a institué un ordre perçu
par l'autre communauté ethnique
principale comme étant répressif et
discriminatoire.
Une campagne électorale a
entériné la compétition entre identités
rivales qui s'exprime dans une lutte
communautaire collective dans
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laquelle les revendications de chaque
communauté en tant que telle ont été
de nouveau relancées et présentées en
des termes intransigeants. Les
victoires répétées de l'un des
segments communautaires sur l'autre
n'ont pas été acceptées par les vaincus
qui ont retiré leur soutien moral à
l'Etat.
61
